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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff7Appellee,

CASENO.20010045-CA

v.

Priority No. 15

KARL ORELLANA,
Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. § 78-2a-3 (2)(e)(2000) wherein the Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction over
appeals from a court of record in a criminal case. Further, pursuant to Rule 22 of the
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, this Court may correct an illegal sentence, or a
sentence imposed in an illegal manner, at any time.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Whether or not the Court abused its discretion and further ruled contrary to its own

prior decisions in determining the defendant had violated his probation and sentenced him
to prison.
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2.

Whether the Judge erred in sentencing the defendant to consecutive sentences

contrary to the prior orders and the preferred use of concurrent sentences.

*

STANDARD OF REVIEW
"The standard of review for a simple legal interpretation of a rule or statute is

(

correctness.... When reviewing legal determinations, an 'appellate court decides the
matter for itself and does not defer in any degree to the trial judge's determination of
law."1 State v. Brooks. 908 P.2d 856 (Utah 1995) citing State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 936
(Utah 1994).
PRESERVATION

i

It is not necessary to preserve in the trial court, the sentencing issues that are the
basis for this appeal. "When a sentence is patently illegal, an appellate court can vacate

<

the illegal sentence without first remanding the case to the trial court, even if the matter
was never raised before." State v. Brooks. 908 P.2d 856 (Utah 1995). Further, the
Defendant filed a Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence on November 15, 2000, thereby
preserving the issue for appeal. (R. 142)
STATUTES, RULES AND
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
Rule 22, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure
Addendum A
Utah Code Annotated § 76-3-401
Addendum B
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On August 24, 1999 the Defendant plead guilty to one count of Tax Evasion a
Second Degree Felony, one count of Tax Evasion a Third Degree Felony, and one count
of Engaging in a Pattern of Unlawful Activity a Second Degree Felony, in connection
with his failure to file State income tax returns and State sales tax returns for the period of
1992 to 1998. (R. 20-28)
On December 17, 1999 the trial court, following the negotiated plea agreement,
sentenced the Defendant on two Second Degree Felonies and one Third Degree Felony to
prison term of from one to fifteen years andfromzero to five year consecutive, suspended
the sentence and placed the Defendant on probation. (R. 44-47) As part of his probation,
the Defendant was to complete 500 hours of community service and pay fines, restitution,
and investigation costs. (R. 44-47) The Defendant was to serve 365 days in jail as part of
his probation, reviewable after sixty days. (R. 45) The Defendant was further ordered to
pay the greater of either three thousand dollars a month or ten percent of his monthly
income. (R. 47)
On March 6, 2000 the court authorized the Defendant's releasefromjail and
ordered him to cooperate with the State Tax Commission officials with respect to his
State income sales tax returns. (R. 75) A review hearing was held on May 15, 2000 at
which time the State claimed that the Defendant was not cooperating. The court ordered
the State to provide a list of materials they demanded from the Defendant and he was
3
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given a period of time to provide the information. The court scheduled a further review
for June 27, 2000.
The review hearing was held on June 27, 2000, at which time the State alleged that
the Defendant, although he had filed all of his returns, had not provided the
documentation to support the returns that the State required. R. 159: 6-9) The court
heard the testimony of David Friedenburg, the Defendant's accountant, who testified that
all of the available documents had been provided. (R. 159: 17, 19) The court determined
that the State could prepare its assessments based on the documents the Defendant had
provided. (R. 159:42). The court did not place the Defendant under another order to
provide any additional documents. At this time, the Defendant was instructed that he
was to complete 50 hours of community service each month for an acceptable
organization beginning in July 2000 or he would be forced to serve time in jail. (R. 159:
42,43)
During this period, the defendant had been taken off formal probation and placed
on court probation through no action on his part. (R. 160: 29, 30) The court, following a
motion by the State, placed the Defendant back on formal probation, although the
Defendant did not have a specific probation officer at that time. (R. 160: 31) During this
period, the Defendant contacted the probation office to get started on his community
service. The Defendant was not able to meet with someone at the probation office so he
called Salt Lake County and began his community service at the Salt Lake County
4
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Complex. (R. 160: 64)
The State filed a Motion for an Order to Show Cause on September 19, 2000
alleging that the Defendant had violated his probation because (1) he had not cooperated
with the tax commission, (2) that he had not paid hisfinesand restitution, and (3) that he
had not completed fifty hours of community service as he was ordered to by the court.
(R. 92-100) The State further alleged that during the audit, the Defendant provided
fraudulent documents concerning his claimed charitable contributions to his church. (R.
93)
A hearing on these matters was held on October 31, 2000. The Defendant entered
an exhibit which showed that he had completed the court-ordered fifty (50) hours a month
of community service since the court's last order. (R. 160: 44) The State did not object
to the entry of this exhibit, but did along with the court question the validity of the work
without having any evidence to the contrary. (R. 160: 58-60) The State also made
assertions that the documents regarding the Defendant's church contributions were
fraudulent. (R. 160: 98) After hearing evidence on this issue presented by the Defendant,
the trial court determined that if any errors did in fact exist, they were a result of the
charitable contribution forms used by the church, and not the fault of the Defendant. (R.
160:81)
The court also heard evidence that the Defendant had not produced any additional
documents to the State Tax Commission or paid anything toward his fines. The
5
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Defendant explained that he was unable to comply with the order requiring him to pay ten
percent of his monthly income or $3,000, whichever was greater. (R. 160: 53) The
Defendant noted that he was unable to make the payments since he was not producing
any income and that the household incomefromall sources was approximately $3,000.
(R. 160: 54) The court determined that the probation condition of paying $3,000 a month
was misleading and that it was the court's intention that he at least pay something each
month. (R. 160: 116)
The court reiterated the concern that the there wasn't anything being paid towards
restitution or the fines and the community service wasn't being adequately performed. (R.
160: 116-118) The court further found that the state has a right to demand that a person
on probation comply with reasonable requests for documents and that the Defendant
failedtodoso. (R. 160: 117, 118)
For the reasons stated above, the court revoked the Defendant's probation and
reinstated his original sentence; for failure to render or sign a tax return, a third
degree felony, zero to five years; willful evasion of sales tax, a second degree felony,
one tofifteenyears; and engaging in a pattern of unlawful activity, a second degree
felony,

one to fifteen years in the Utah State Penitentiary. (R. 160: 118) The court

noted that the sentences were to run consecutive to one another and ordered the
Defendant to be immediately taken into custody and transported to the Utah State Prison.
(R. 160:119)
6
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On November 15, 2000, the Defendant filed a motion and accompanying
memorandum pursuant to Rule 22(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure to correct
the illegal sentence and requested a hearing thereon. (R. 142-143) In a ruling dated
November 17, 2000, the court denied the Defendant's Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence
and the request for hearing. (R. 152) The Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal on
November 30, 2000 for the immediate revocation of his probation (R. 148-149) and for
the consecutive sentences. (R. 150-151)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The court abused its discretion when it ruled contrary to its own order in revoking
the Defendant's probation and immediately transporting him to the Utah State
Penitentiary. The court did not have factual evidence sufficient to support revocation of
the Defendant's probation.
Further, the court erred in sentencing the Defendant to consecutive sentences. The
court did not have sufficient grounds to warrant the imposition of this sentence. A court
is to "consider the gravity and circumstances of the offenses and the history, character,
and rehabilitative needs of the defendant in determining whether to impose consecutive
sentences." Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401 (4). The circumstances in this case did not
warrant the imposition of consecutive sentences.

7
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ARGUMENT
I.

THE STATE ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY REVOKING
THE DEFENDANT'S PROBATION AND SENTENCED HIM
TO PRISON.

<

"The decision to grant, modify, or revoke probation is in the discretion of the trial
court." State v. Jamieson. 800 P.2d 798, 804 (Utah 1990) accord State v. Arcellidae. 812
P.2d 80, 82 (Utah App. 1991). In order for the Defendant to prevail, he must demonstrate
"that the evidence of a probation violation, viewed in a light most favorable to the trial
court's findings, is so deficient that the trial court abused its discretion in revoking
defendant's probation." Jamieson. 800 P.2d at 804, Arcellidae. 812 P.2d at 82.

i

The trial court heard evidence regarding the failure of the Defendant to perform
certain probation requirements. The Defendant made proffers of evidence to demonstrate

,

his compliance with his probation conditions. The authenticity of the evidence and
documentation provided by the Defendant was disputed and discounted by the State and
trial court.
A.

Requested Documentation

The State requested various documents at the June 27,2000 hearing regarding the
amount of taxes the Defendant owed the State. Further, at the June hearing, the court
stated that if the Defendant did not provide any further documentation, the tax
assessments would be prepared based on the supplied information (R. 159: 38) and the
Defendant would waive the right to challenge the assessments. (R. 159: 37). The trial
8
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court concluded stating to the Defendant that "Any documents that [the auditor] has asked
for if they're not supplied within thirty days of today's date I will tell you that that is your
agreement that they don't need to be supplied she can go ahead and make and assessment
based upon what her documents show. You can come in here and fight whether or not the
assessment is correct." (R. 159: 42). Therefore, although the Defendant had provided
much of the requested information, if he did not submit any further documentation, the
assessment would be based on what he had provided.
As of the October 31,2000 hearing, the Utah State Tax Commission was still in
need of some substantiation of the Defendant's expenses. The Tax Commission noted
some letters sent to the Defendant requesting information and admitted that they had
received some of the documentation. (R. 160: 15) The Defendant testified that he had
given the State everything he had in his possession. As to the sales tax portion of the
dispute, the Defendant testified that the business records were available to the auditor
when they first met and that she was invited to take any records that she needed. (R. 160:
47-48). The Defendant provided all of the documentation that he had in his control in
compliance with the trial court's order.
Following witness testimony and closing arguments of both parties, the trial court
found that the Defendant had not supplied the Tax Commission with all of the requested
documents. The court referenced the June hearing during which the Defendant was told
to turn over the documents within thirty days. The Defendant testified that he personally
9
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had provided all of the documents in his possession in response to the Tax Commission's
various requests. Further, that his accountant had supplied further information as a result
of these requests. The trial court chose to disregard the testimony regarding the
submission of the documents to the requesting authority and found that the Defendant had
simply chosen not to comply with the order.
B.

Restitution and Fine Payments

The trial court also heard evidence regarding the Defendant's ability to make
restitution payments, a condition of his probation. The condition required the Defendant
to pay $3,000 a month or ten percent of his gross monthly income, whichever was greater.
The Defendant testified that he was not in a financial position to make the payments
pursuant to his probation order. (R. 160: 53)
The Defendant testified that he had not had a monthly income exceeding $3,000 in
the months since the order. For thefirstthree months, the Defendant was incarcerated.
Following his release, he was terminated from his employment prior to his incarceration.
In addition to his terminated employment, his family owned business declined. The
Defendant has not generated any personal incomefromthe business.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court found that due to the confusing
nature of the fine and restitution payments, the probation condition requiring the
Defendant to pay $3,000 or ten percent of his monthly gross income was to be stricken
because it was inconsistent with the trial court's intent.
10
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C.

Community Service

The Defendant was ordered to completefiftyhours of community service with a
state approved agency each month as a condition of his probation. The Defendant
testified that he had been performing his community service at the Salt Lake County
Department of Public Works. (R. 160: 58) The Defendant was questioned extensively on
the type of work he did and who he worked with. Further, the State questioned how the
Defendant came upon the Department of Public Works for his community service since
Adult Probation and Parole did not specifically refer him there. (R. 160: 65) The
Defendant explained that he contacted the county in an effort to complete his fifty hour
monthly probation requirement. The Department of Public Works was on the list
provided to him by the county and was thefirstplace with which the Defendant was able
to make arrangements.
The trial court came to the conclusion that because the Defendant chose to do his
community service with the Department of Public Works, an organization he selected on
his own, it was not sufficient to meet the probation requirements and questioned the
authenticity of the community service document. The court also pointed out that prior to
the hearing, the Defendant had failed to file any documentation of the work he had
completed.
The Defendant testified and presented other evidence of his attempts to comply
with the conditions of his probation. This Court has consistently held that in order for a
11
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trial court to revoke probation based on a probation violation, the court must determine by
a preponderance of the evidence that the violation was willful. State v. Peterson. 869
P.2d 989 (Utah App. 1994) citing Arcellidae. 812 P.2d at 84, accord State v. Ruesga. 851
P.2d 1229, 1232 (Utah App. 1993); State v Hodges. 798 P.2d 270, 277 (Utah App. 1990).
The Court in Archuleta found that willfulness "merely requires a finding that the
probationer did not make bona fide efforts to meet the conditions of his probation."
Archuleta. 812 P.2d at 84.
At the October 31, 2000 hearing the Defendant demonstrated that he was making
bona fide efforts to meet the conditions of his probation. The Defendant provided the Tax
Commission with all of the documents he had access to. He demonstrated that he was
unable to meet the fine and restitution payment schedule which was subsequently struck
from the order, due to a lack of income. Finally, the Defendant testified regarding the
community service he was engaged in, pursuant to the trial court's order of fifty hours a
month.
The trial court erred in revoking the Defendant's probation without just cause. In
Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 103 S.Ct. 2064, 76 L.Ed. 2d 221 (1993), a case
involving a defendant's failure to may fine sind restitution payments, the United States
Supreme Court held that in order for a trial court to revoke probation for failure to make
fine and restitution payments, the court must eitherfindthat the probationer was at fault
or that alternatives other than imprisonment are inadequate to meet the state's interests in
12
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punishment and deterrence. Id. at 672. If the Defendant is incarcerated, he is unable to
produce any income to make fine and retribution payments or do his community service.
There are other less restrictive methods by which the State can meet its punishment and
deterrence objectives.
The trial court abused its discretion in revoking the Defendant's probation. The
court did not have just cause to revoke the Defendant's probation and send him
immediately to prison following the hearing. The Defendant was making bona fide
efforts to comply with the conditions of his probation, therefore any violation of the
conditions was not willful.
II

THE COURT ERRED IN SENTENCING THE DEFENDANT TO
CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES.

Pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 76-3-401(1), f,[a] court shall determine, if a
defendant has been adjudged guilty of more than one felony offense, whether to impose
concurrent or consecutive sentences for the offenses." Subsection (4) further states that
11

[a] court shall consider the gravity and circumstances of the offenses and the history,

character, and rehabilitative needs of the defendant in determining whether to impose
consecutive sentences."
The Defendant pled guilty to three charges: failure to make, render, sign, or verify
tax return, a third degree felony, willful evasion of sales tax, a second degree felony and
engaging in a patter of unlawful activity, a second degree felony. While all three of these
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charges are felonies, none are first degree felonies. There was no one physically injured
in the commission of any of these crimes. The charges are all serious, but when
considering the gravity and circumstances of these crimes, none rise to the level
warranting consecutive sentences.
The next consideration for the sentencing court is the Defendant's criminal history.
Prior to the current charges, the Defendant did not have any prior criminal history. In
State v. Galli. 967 P.2d 930 (Utah 1998) the Utah Supreme Court found that the trial
court abused its discretion in sentencing the defendant to consecutive sentences. The
Supreme Court analyzed the four factors in Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(4) to determine
whether or not the trial court abused its discretion. When considering the defendant's
criminal history, the court determined that a criminal history consisting of minor traffic
offenses and one misdemeanor theft conviction was not sufficient to justify consecutive
sentences. The Defendant does not have any prior criminal history, which should have
been considered by the sentencing court when making the consecutive sentence
determination.
The third factor to be considered by a trial court in sentencing is the character of
the Defendant. The Defendant pled guilty to the charges and has taken responsibility for
his actions. Prior to his incarceration, the Defendant made a good faith effort to comply
with the terms of his probation while getting his life and finances back in order. The
Defendant is completely capable of being a productive member society. Therefore, the
14
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trial court abused its discretion when it sentenced the Defendant to consecutive prison
terms based on his character.
The fourth and final statutory factor for the court to consider is the rehabilitative
needs of the Defendant. The Defendant is quite capable of being a productive, lawabiding citizen. Prior to his incarceration, the Defendant was making progress towards
completing his community service. The Defendant and society would be better served if
the Defendant was able to complete his community service and pay his fines and
restitution. The Defendant cannot make progress towards rehabilitation while
incarcerated. At the very least, the trial court should have imposed concurrent as opposed
to consecutive sentences.
An analysis of the four statutory factors found in Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(4),
demonstrates that the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing the Defendant to
consecutive sentences instead of the preferred concurrent sentence. While serious, the
gravity of the Defendant's actions did not rise to the level at which consecutive sentences
could be justified. The Defendant had no prior criminal history and further accepted
responsibility for his actions by pleading guilty to the charged offenses. Finally, the
Defendant's rehabilitative needs will not be met by extended incarceration. The trial
court clearly abused its discretion in sentencing the Defendant to consecutive prison
terms.

15
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CONCLUSION
The trial court erred by disregarding evidence of the Defendant's good faith efforts
to comply with the conditions of his probation, and further ruled contrary to its prior order
revoking the Defendant's probation. The trial court also abused its discretion by initially
sentencing the Defendant to consecutive as opposed to concurrent sentences without
due consideration of the four statutory factors found in Utah Code Annotated § 76-3401(4).
The Defendant should be releasedfromprison and his probation reinstated.
Should the Defendant's probation not be reinstated, this case should be remanded to the
trial court for re-sentencing in accordance with Utah Code Annotated § 76-3-401(4).
DATED this

%?\

day of (/Mj^

,2001.

istian, Sjrordas & Caston
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RULE 22, UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Sentence, judgment and commitment
(a) Upon the entry of a plea or verdict of guilty or plea of no contest, the court shall set a
time for imposing sentence which shall be not less than two nor more than 45 days after
the verdict or plea, unless the court, with the concurrence of the defendant, otherwise
orders. Pending sentence, the court may commit the defendant or may continue or alter
bail or recognizance.
Before imposing sentence the court shall afford the defendant an opportunity to make a
statement and to present any information in mitigation of punishment, or to show any
legal cause why sentence should not be imposed. The prosecuting attorney shall also be
given an opportunity to present any information material to the imposition of sentence.
(b) On the same grounds that a defendant may be tried in defendant's absence, defendant
may likewise be sentenced in defendant's absence. If a defendant fails to appear for
sentence, a warrant for defendant's arrest may be issued by the court.
(c) Upon a verdict or plea of guilty or plea of no contest, the court shall impose sentence
and shall enter a judgment of conviction which shall include the plea or the verdict, if
any, and the sentence. Following imposition of sentence, the court shall advise the
defendant of defendant's right to appeal and the time within which any appeal shall be
filed.
(d) When a jail or prison sentence is imposed, the court shall issue its commitment setting
forth the sentence. The officer delivering the defendant to the jail or prison shall deliver a
true copy of the commitment to the jail or prison and shall make the officer's return on the
commitment and file it with the court.
(e) The court may correct an illegal sentence, or a sentence imposed in an illegal manner,
at any time.
(f) Upon a verdict or plea of guilty and mentally ill, the court shall impose sentence in
accordance with Title 77, Chapter 16a, Utah Code. If the court retains jurisdiction over a
mentally ill offender committed to the Department of Human Services as provided by
Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-16a-202(l)(b), the court shall so specify in the sentencing order.
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UTAH CODE ANNOTATED SECTION 76-3-401
Concurrent or consecutive sentences - Limitations - Definition
(1) A court shall determine, if a defendant has been adjudged guilty of more than one
felony offense, whether to impose concurrent or consecutive sentences for the offenses.
Sentenced for state offenses shall run concurrently unless the court states in the sentence
that they shall run consecutively.
(2) The court shall order that sentences for state offenses run consecutively if the later
offense is committed while the defendant is imprisoned or on parole unless the court finds
and states on the record that consecutive sentencing would be inappropriate.
(3) If an order of commitment does not clearly state whether the sentences shall run
consecutively or concurrently, and the Board of Pardons and Parole has reason to believe
that the later offense occurred while the person was imprisoned or on parole for the
earlier offense, the board shall request clarification from the court. Upon receipt of the
request, the court shall enter an amended order of commitment stating whether the
sentences are to run consecutively or concurrently.
(4) A court shall consider the gravity and circumstances of the offenses and the history,
character, and rehabilitative needs of the defendant in determining whether to impose
consecutive sentences.
(5) A court may impose consecutive sentences for offenses arising out of a single criminal
episode as defined in Section 76-1-401.
(6) (a) If a court imposes consecutive sentences, the aggregate maximum of all sentences
imposed may not exceed 30 years imprisonment, except as provided under Subsection
(6)(b).
(b) The limitation under Subsection (6)(a) does not apply if:
(i) an offense for which the defendant is sentenced authorizes the death penalty or
a maximum sentence of life imprisonment; or
(ii) the defendant is convicted of an addition offense based on conduct which
occurs after his initial sentence or sentences are imposed.
(7) The limitation in Subsection (6)(a) applies if a defendant:
(a) is sentenced at the same time for more than one offense;
(b) is sentenced at different times for one or more offenses, all of which were
committed prior to imposition of the defendant's initial sentence; or
(c) has already been sentenced by a court of this state other than the present
sentencing court or by a court of another state or federal jurisdiction, and the conduct
giving rise to the present offense did not occur after his initial sentencing by any other
court.
(8) When the limitation of Subsection (6)(a) applies, determining the effect of
consecutive sentences and the manner in which they shall be served, the Board of Pardons
and Parole shall treat the defendant as though he has been committed for a single term
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that shall consist of the aggregate of the validly imposed prison terms as follows:
(a) if the aggregate maximum term exceeds the 30-year limitation, the maximum
sentence is considered to be 30 years; and
(b) when indeterminate sentences run consecutively, the minimum term, if any,
constitutes the aggregate of the validly imposed minimum terms.
(9) When a sentence is imposed or sentences are imposed to run concurrently with the
other or with a sentence presently being served, the lesser sentence shall merge into the
greater and the greater shall be the term to be served. If the sentences are equal and
concurrent, they shall merge into one sentence with the most recent conviction
constituting the time to be served.
(10) This section may not be construed to restrict the number or length of individual
consecutive sentences that may be imposed or to affect the validity of any sentence so
imposed, but only to limit the length of sentences actually served under the commitments.
(11) This section may not be construed to limit the authority of a court to impose
consecutive sentences in misdemeanor cases.
(12) As used in this section, "imprisoned" means sentenced and committed to a secure
correctional facility as defined in Section 64-13-1, the sentence has not been terminated
or voided, and the person is not on parole, regardless of where the person is located.
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